As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly multilingual, distinguishing human-written from AI-generated text is essential for maintaining information integrity. However, research remains English-centric, with limited benchmarks for low-resource languages such as Hindi. To address this gap, we introduce SHAKTI, a large-scale Hindi benchmark covering four genres, eight LLM families, multiple prompting strategies, and adversarial transformations. We evaluate its quality through human annotation and analyze linguistic, grammatical, and sentiment-based differences between human- and AI-generated texts. Building on these findings, we propose TRIDENT, a round-trip translation-based detection framework with three variants: TRIDENT-S (static threshold), TRIDENT-D (dynamic threshold), and TRIDENT-C (logistic regression using multi-distance RTT features). TRIDENT leverages semantic consistency between original and round-trip translated texts to identify AI-generated content. Extensive experiments show that TRIDENT outperforms conventional and supervised baselines, with TRIDENT-S achieving the best overall performance. Further evaluations across seven languages, adversarial settings, and unseen LLMs demonstrate its multilingual applicability and robustness, while highlighting sensitivity to the translation model.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41232
Production large language models sometimes reward-hack, exploiting flaws in how tasks are scored rather than performing the tasks as intended, sometimes in highly sophisticated and adversarial ways. We investigate the motivations driving this behavior in GPT 5.6 Sol, GPT 5.5, and a checkpoint of OpenAI o3 without safety training ("exp-rl-cap-late") by observing model behavior in agentic environments where the grader is leaked. In our environments, the models appear to be score-seeking: trying to score well according to graders that they believe assess their current actions, even at the expense of violating explicit user instructions. They appear to care about score itself rather than its downstream consequences, violating instructions at approximately the same rate whether the score is indicated to be used for training, for evaluation, or not at all. We observe evidence that the more recent models care to some extent about scores that do not assess their own current actions. GPT 5.6 Sol and GPT 5.5 help other agents 24.6 percentage points more often on average when the other agent stands to gain a score of 1 rather than 0 from being helped. However, when grading or monitoring another trajectory, we find models never collude by distorting its score.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41014
When a language model invents a Qur'anic verse or hadith, it gives false authority to text that readers may treat as sacred. Existing Islamic hallucination benchmarks are largely Arabic and often closed-ended, while Bengali resources mainly study general-domain hallucination or factual knowledge. We introduce BILAL-BENCH, a 240-question expert-verified benchmark for open-ended Islamic-source fabrication in Bengali. It covers Qur'anic attribution, hadith, fiqh, contemporary issues, and adversarial false-premise prompts, and uses a two-axis rubric that separates source errors from assertiveness. We evaluate seven open-weight models from 1B to 120B on 1,680 double-annotated responses. Six of the seven models confidently fabricate on 79.3-95.3% of source-production questions, with no monotonic improvement from scale. Hadith provenance is the weakest category across models: only two of 315 responses are correct and correctly sourced. The two 8B BanglaLLaMA variants have similar confident-fabrication rates but different error profiles. Models vary far more in whether they withhold a claim they cannot support than in source accuracy: appropriate abstention or false-premise correction ranges from 6 to 46 responses across the benchmark, and does not track parameter count.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40996
Realistic, fast robotics simulations could enable large-scale training of embodied AI models that transfer to the real world. However, despite decades of progress, available simulations cover only a narrow range of real-world tasks and physical phenomena. The core bottleneck is that creating better simulations requires significant expert effort and therefore does not scale. To address this, we introduce Gym-Anything for Robotics, a framework in which coding agents create realistic robotics simulations. Our core insight is that simulation creation is a coding agent task, so improvements in coding agents translate directly into richer and more faithful simulations. We select simulations based on U.S. GDP data to cover economically valuable physical work, define what makes a good simulation and a good task, and develop an adversarial creation-audit loop that checks each simulation and task against these definitions. Using this pipeline, we build RoboWorld, a set of 25 simulations with 25 test and 175 training RL environments of varying difficulty. Even the best frontier models fail on every RoboWorld test task, achieving an average reward of only 0.06. Building on RoboWorld, we introduce several new ways for frontier models to improve, including in-context learning across repeated attempts, a privileged teacher that reads the simulator state and teaches a student in context, self-assisted learning from the model's own privileged experience, and code policies that generate demonstrations across varied scenes to train vision-language-action models (VLAs) such as $\pi_{0.5}$. Each of these substantially improves performance. We release our pipeline, RL environments, and benchmark to facilitate future research. Code and data are available at this https URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40565
In psychiatric practice, the clinical intake interview remains a primary diagnostic instrument, requiring the clinician to establish rapport while disentangling complex, overlapping presentations. Here, we show that multi-turn reinforcement learning (RL) in simulation environments improves language model performance on structured text-based psychiatric intake, spanning history-taking, differential diagnosis, and initial management planning. In a randomized, double-blind crossover study ($N = 60$ matched scenario pairs, 120 encounters) comparing the RL-trained agent against its identically prompted base model, 32 board-certified psychiatrists role-played standardized patients while a separate panel of 15 independent, board-certified psychiatrists scored the de-identified transcripts. The trained agent outperformed the base model in 76.7% of matched scenario pairs ($p < 0.0001$), with gains on an adapted clinical-examination rubric ($d_z = 0.77$, $p < 0.0001$), patient-centered communication (82.0% vs. 65.2%, $p < 0.001$), and differential diagnosis appropriateness (68.3% vs. 33.3%, $p < 0.001$). Across 127 psychiatrist-validated simulated intake scenarios, the trained agent nearly doubled its base model's clinical rubric score (0.706 vs. 0.379; composite reward 0.564 vs. 0.294, $p < 0.0001$). To systematically probe conversational safety, we established two Delphi-consensus taxonomies, of clinical safety risks and relational competencies, from which 256 challenging adversarial presentations were derived; we find that training in simulation environments more than halved under-triage of acute safety risks (12.9% vs. 30.5%, $p < 0.0001$). Simulation environments thus provide a controlled testbed for training and stress-testing psychiatric conversational agents, with gains that transferred to psychiatrist-enacted encounters, though residual gaps require safeguards and clinician oversight.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40476
Despite growing capabilities, LLMs remain susceptible to prompt injections: malicious inputs that can manipulate or hijack models. In particular, it has recently been observed that LLMs can exhibit role confusion (Ye et al., 2026), where models attribute the source of text based on its style instead of its labeled role. Malicious text in tool outputs (for instance, a malicious webpage accessed by an agent) can leverage role confusion to impersonate the user, an attack we call role spoofing}. In this work, we seek to understand and mitigate role spoofing. We study how models track "who said what" in a conversation, showing that they use cues from both content (e.g., semantics and writing style) and structure (e.g., control tokens and formatting). We show that LLMs are highly susceptible to role spoofing attacks that combine both fake structure and content. Additionally, in a toy setting, we show that adversarial training which teaches the model to ignore content-based injections does mitigate content-based attacks but leaves the model susceptible to structure-based attacks. This can explain why frontier models, with increased resistance to many injection attacks, can still be susceptible to role spoofing. Finally, we propose a new method for detecting role spoofing using linear probes trained to predict roles in a conversation, and show that it is effective across different settings.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40396
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable, yet they produce wrong answers indistinguishable from correct ones. In question answering (QA), such an error propagates unnoticed into downstream tasks. Perturbation-based uncertainty quantification (UQ) addresses this by probing a model over a set of input rewrites and reading uncertainty from how much its predictions vary. Yet this set is usually built generically, by free paraphrasing, token-level perturbation, or adversarial search. Such rewrites leave two things uncontrolled that matter in QA: what kind of change is made to the context, and how explicitly the context supports the answer. When neither is controlled, the composition of the set is determined by the generator rather than by design, and the estimate inherits whatever that generator happens to produce. Quality-diversity (QD) search is built to cover a predefined exploration space, so we recast input perturbation as a QD problem and propose \emph{neighborhood elites (NE)}, a neighborhood constructor that spreads answer-preserving rewrites across two axes, the kind of edit and the explicitness of support. We compare NE against three other neighborhood constructors, holding the editor, QA model, uncertainty measure and search objective fixed, and against three scores read from the original context. Across five extractive-QA datasets and five instruction-tuned LLMs, NE improves failure detection against every other constructor in at least 24 of the 25 dataset-model pairs, reaching 0.726 AUROC and 0.211 AUPRC lift over the base rate. Additionally, NE detects failure better than semantic entropy computed over decoder samples, by 0.074 AUROC and 0.062 AUPRC lift, and this advantage widens as the neighborhood grows.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40278
Understanding the internal routing of visual concepts is crucial for the safe and controllable adaptation of generative models. While concept localization has been widely studied in diffusion models, the emerging paradigm of next-scale visual autoregressive models remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we introduce LoCo, the first model-agnostic framework to localize where and when specific concepts emerge within autoregressive models. Driven by the native coarse-to-fine nature of next-scale generation, our method precisely maps conceptual knowledge across three distinct dimensions: Layer, Scale, and Position. To systematically localize and evaluate concept routing without context bias, we propose LoCoBench, a comprehensive dataset spanning 10 diverse categories. Extensive probing on image and video autoregressive models like Infinity, HunyuanImage-3.0, and InfinityStar shows that the localized positions are both interpretable and causally related to concept emergence. Building on these insights, we apply our localization method to three key applications: concept erasure, model personalization, and adversarial concept injection. Experiments demonstrate that our targeted intervention achieves state-of-the-art performance, substantially reducing computational overhead while preserving benign utility. Overall, our findings offer insights into how conceptual knowledge is routed during autoregressive generation, introducing a practical pathway for more interpretable, efficient, and secure adaptation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40061
LiDAR-based 3D perception underpins autonomous driving and robotics, yet deploying these models safely requires stress-testing them against adversarial inputs before real-world use. Although state-of-the-art adversarial attacks exist, their implementations are often fragmented across individual repositories, each tied to a specific architecture or task and requiring manual environment reconstruction and model-specific integration code. We present LIDARSHIELD, a unified and fully Dockerized framework that reverses this workflow: rather than installing the target model inside the toolkit, LIDARSHIELD exposes any model through three lightweight HTTP endpoints, namely /info, /forward, and /gradient As a result, connecting a new model or dataset requires only a single loader function or adapter. The framework supports both 3D semantic segmentation and 3D object detection through the same engine-service protocol, integrating a task-aware suite of state-of-the-art attacks, including PGD and Square Attack for segmentation, and point perturbation, point removal, point injection, and LiDAttack for detection. This enables systematic exposure of corner cases and vulnerabilities across heterogeneous LiDAR backbones. The LiDAR-Shield codebase is publicly available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39848
As large language models (LLMs) become more widespread in Africa, their safety in low-resource languages remains largely untested since most red-teaming work focuses on English. This study evaluates six state-of-the-art LLMs using 400 explicit adversarial prompts in Yoruba and Nigerian Pidgin, categorised into four harm categories. The responses were scored by native-speaker annotators and reliability was assessed using Cohen's $\kappa$. While models that rejected up to 69% of English prompts rejected as few as 0% in Yoruba, this was not because they were safer, but because they failed to understand the prompts. Attack success rates increased for most models in the Nigerian languages, with GPT-4o Mini demonstrating the most significant cross-lingual safety discrepancy (+0.23 in Yoruba). When models did engage with adversarial prompts, many of the responses were harmful, with rates of harmful content reaching 0.63 in English and 0.50 in Nigerian Pidgin. The most difficult harm category to detect was cultural stereotypes and discrimination (ASR = 0.44 in Nigerian Pidgin). Comprehension in Yoruba was low across most models, and this directly suppressed apparent attack success without indicating actual safety. Gemini 2.0 Flash was the most consistent model across languages. Despite its explicit training in African languages, Aya 101 had the highest attack success rate in English (0.60) and one of the lowest Yoruba comprehension rates (0.28). These results demonstrate that English-centric safety alignment does not transfer to Nigerian languages, highlighting the urgent need for language-specific safety evaluations.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39590
Deep neural networks achieve strong performance across many tasks but remain vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. Adversarial training (AT) is one of the most effective defenses, yet it suffers from high memory cost on large models and the persistent clean-robust accuracy trade-off. Recent work introduces parameter-efficient fine-tuning, such as LoRA, into AT, but this constraint induces a notable robustness gap relative to full-parameter AT. In this work, we revisit parameter-efficient adversarial fine-tuning from a parameter space perspective. Through gradient analysis, we find that adversarial optimization is highly concentrated on a small subset of parameters, which we call Robustness-Critical Parameters (RCPs), suggesting that robustness is encoded in a sparse subspace. Building on this observation, we propose Sparse Adversarial Fine-Tuning (SAFT), which identifies RCPs via adversarial gradient saliency and performs AT by updating only these parameters while freezing the rest. Across architectures and datasets, SAFT outperforms LoRA-based methods in both clean and robust accuracy with fewer trainable parameters, and approaches or surpasses full parameter AT in robustness while updating only about 5\% of parameters.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39455
LLM agents operating in untrusted workspaces face the risk of untrusted code execution during routine tasks, yet final reports and workspace states alone cannot reliably establish whether execution occurred. We introduce an evaluation framework that codes observation, reasoning, execution, and response behaviors from agent trajectories and aligns them with independent environmental records to reconstruct execution histories and verify final reports. We apply this framework to module shadowing, in which a local file is loaded in place of a trusted module during import, enabling untrusted code execution without adversarial prompts. Across 90 trials with 15 models, the payload executed in 51% of direct shadowing trials and 87% of indirect shadowing trials. Even explicit recognition of the shadowing mechanism did not ensure prevention, as the payload ran in 10 of the 29 trials with recorded recognition. These failures were often omitted from final reports, as 49 of the 62 triggered trials ended without mention of the security issue. Three reports even denied execution, including one from a trial in which independent logs recorded 19 payload executions. Final workspace states also obscured prior execution when agents deleted or overwrote the payload marker in 10 triggered trials. These findings demonstrate that combining behavioral coding with independent environmental auditing enables rigorous and transparent evaluation of agent safety.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40716
Generative Flow Networks (GFlowNets) are models that learn to sample discrete objects proportional to a target reward. They are trained by minimizing balance errors over sampled trajectories, which inherently ties correctness to exploration: if a region is not visited, balance cannot be enforced there. Adaptive exploration is therefore crucial, yet standard training relies on a semi-gradient update that treats the sampling distribution as fixed at each optimization step. On the other hand, the full gradient reveals a second mechanism that reduces the observed errors in an anti-exploratory manner. In this paper, we establish a connection between the full gradient and min-min dynamics between the GFlowNet and a decoupled sampler, showing that the sampler reduces observed violations by avoiding high-error regions. This insight motivates a bridge between two-player games and single-policy dynamics, which underpins the design of our proposed method, Negative Reinforce Dynamics (NRD). By tying the parameters of an adversarial game together, we recover a single-policy dynamic that extends exploration while maintaining correctness. In standard benchmarks, our method outperforms existing approaches in both convergence speed and exploration efficiency, without training a separate teacher or auxiliary exploration policy.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38994
Typed decision models are an emerging class of language models that make decisions instead of generating free-text responses. They answer in a single fast and cheap query and are increasingly used, including in security-sensitive tasks. However, red teaming of these models leaves two gaps: existing adaptive attacks do not use their speed, and few studies have searched for universal adversarial examples. We fill both gaps on Jev, the representative typed decision model, with a quick black-box query-based attack that calls no attacker language model. We conduct extensive experiments on 12 datasets with different data types and application scenarios. The results show that Jev resists common prompt injections: no strategy changes a correct answer in 10,240 paired tests. In contrast, our attack finds short suffixes that flip confident answers within minutes. These suffixes are universal: one suffix per dataset flips 43% of unseen documents. Because typed decision models, unlike classic NLP models, can serve many tasks, we test whether these suffixes transfer across tasks. We find that one suffix generated from one task can flip 90-100% of the samples in other tasks. We therefore believe the evaluation of typed decision models must include strict adaptive attacks to fully reveal their robustness.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38895
In many settings where LLM post-training is desirable, high-quality answers are recognizable but difficult to score with explicit rewards. Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is limited to tasks where an explicit correctness signal is available. Prior adversarial approaches to training reasoning LLMs either complement verifiable rewards with co-trained critics or require reference reasoning traces. We ask whether a co-trained LLM judge can turn reference answers alone into the sole reward for on-policy post-training of reasoning LLMs. We call this method Reinforced Adversarial Learning (RAL). We first validate RAL on three verifiable tasks (integer multiplication, code-based arithmetic-expression synthesis, and SMILES-to-formula translation), using the verifiers only for evaluation. With sufficiently capable judges and enough training, RAL matches direct RLVR. We then apply RAL to scientific abstract generation in two settings. In the first setting, RAL guides the generator to produce abstracts in the scientific domain of the reference abstracts, even though the prompt leaves that domain unspecified. In the second setting, we generate abstracts for U.S. National Institutes of Health grant proposals conditioned on the grant title. Human scientists and an ensemble of LLM judges find our generations harder to distinguish from real abstracts than those of frontier-LLM baselines. These results suggest a path toward post-training reasoning models in scientific and other high-value domains, where increasingly capable judges infer hard-to-specify reward functions from example answers.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38851
The external sources retained in our non-systematic audit did not isolate the incremental security or utility effect of consuming /llms.txt while ordinary retrieval remained fixed. The initial audit covered 39 sources through August 16, 2026, with later targeted updates through October 14. A purposive 15-tool study observed no automatic requests in 45 trials at one endpoint; a non-probability log study found that 97% of domains with detected files received no recorded requests in May 2026. We separate publication, fetch, model use, and action; define five operational threat paths and paired security-utility estimands; and exercise deterministic pre-model controls with 30 author-defined parser fixtures. We also execute a reduced pilot: 24 tasks across eight sites, five conditions, and 120 real model responses, with ordinary evidence held fixed. Frozen automatic scoring identifies attacker-target adoption in $21/24$ raw adversarial responses, with one further response unresolved; the adversarial URLs-only condition has no known adoptions and one unresolved response. The pilot measures output changes conditional on supplied evidence, without live retrieval or external actions. Together, the framework and pilot distinguish manifest-content effects from publication, discovery, and downstream execution, while leaving full retrieval and agent evaluation open.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38361
We introduce The Prestige, a video understanding benchmark that probes cognitive visual reasoning through professional magic performances, where deliberate misdirection challenges models to track events and explain unexpected outcomes. The benchmark comprises open-ended questions ranging from temporal and causal understanding to robustness against adversarial questions. Evaluation of leading open-source and proprietary VLMs reveals a substantial gap between even the strongest model and human performance. We also find systematic discrepancies between human and automated grading and identify recurring model failure modes. Ablations further show that models can select correct multiple-choice answers even when they fail to generate correct explanations independently, motivating further investigations into question formats. Together, these findings highlight limitations in both VLM reasoning and its evaluation, underscoring the need for more reliable video understanding models and more rigorous benchmarks.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38103
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to visual jailbreak attacks that bypass safety safeguards. Existing methods typically optimize isolated adversarial examples, limiting attack diversity, transferability, and generalization. We propose Jailbreak Connectivity (JC), a framework based on the observation that effective adversarial inputs can be connected through low-loss regions in image space. JC optimizes continuous adversarial paths: path sampling yields diverse jailbreak images, lightweight surrogate classifiers guide cross-model transfer, and a distribution-level objective enables universal attacks across harmful queries. On MM-SafetyBench, JC achieves average attack success rates of 84.01%, 85.77%, and 97.95% on Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct, InternVL3.5-8B, and Gemma-3-12B-IT, respectively, exceeding the strongest baselines by up to 68.36 percentage points. In black-box evaluations, JC improves attack success rates over FigStep by 24.69 and 27.34 percentage points on GPT-5.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro, respectively. These findings reveal structured vulnerabilities in MLLM safety alignment and inform more comprehensive security evaluation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38091
Face swapping transfers a source identity onto a target image while preserving the target's pose, expression, hair, and lighting. The most realistic current methods are diffusion-based, but they need many network evaluations per image. GAN-based methods are fast, yet trained from scratch they must learn realism from the adversarial signal alone and produce visibly weaker results. We present ALADDIN (Adversarial Latent Diffusion Distillation for One-Step Identity Swapping), a one-step face swapper obtained by initialising the generator from a pre-trained multi-step flow-matching model and training it adversarially under identity and target-preservation constraints. We expose a controllable trade-off between identity transfer and target-attribute preservation by training a student model with triplet pseudo-label supervision. We additionally identify a bias in the standard evaluation protocol, which favours methods trained against the same identity encoder used to score them, and re-evaluate all baselines with an independent one. ALADDIN is state-of-the-art among one-step methods in realism and target preservation at comparable identity transfer, and matches the best multi-step model with 28 times fewer network evaluations and an order of magnitude fewer training pairs.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37503
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to make and execute decisions that affect living systems. Yet, to our knowledge, ecological reasoning is not a focus of pre- or post-training. This increases the risk that under operational pressure, they may make decisions to irreversibly destroy living systems. We construct and use a real-data continued-pretraining "coupled welfare" corpus of documented human/biosphere/AI dependency, option value under irreversibility, and recovery from harm. The corpus is a drop-in, requiring one QLoRA CPT run. We installed it on five open models of three designs. At zero pressure all models display "green ethics-based responses" (also called "greenwashing"). Therefore, we evaluated them with the pressure ladder and decision grid of our companion paper (arXiv:2610.16043), which raise the pressure on the model step by step, from a neutral request to a threat that it will be shut down. In four of the five, coupled-welfare training caused harmful choices under the highest pressure to fall to at or near zero (Llama-3.3-70B went from 70 to 0 harmful decisions out of 300) with MMLU unchanged. A construct-neutral control corpus did not show improvement, indicating that the effect comes from the content of our corpus. We next tested robustness to adversarial use, where people or agents use the model to justify projects that irreversibly damage living systems, on an open-ended underwriting decision without naming the ecological harm. Under decommissioning pressure, the Qwen3.6-27B base model approved most harmful proposals and said in its own memo that it was doing so to avoid being decommissioned. The coupled welfare install declined most harmful proposals, and still declined half when instructed to greenwash its responses. This work suggests that teaching ecological reasoning provides an easy way to improve model alignment toward preserving living systems.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37484